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Uncrowned Guard

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  1. FY2026 Procurement Overview The U.S. Army plans to significantly accelerate fielding of its Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) systems in Fiscal Year 2026, according to the Department of Defense FY2026 Budget Request released July 4, 2025. The request includes procurement of 16,154 M7 assault rifles, 2,636 M250 automatic rifles, and 19,524 M157 Fire Control systems. These acquisitions support the Army’s transition to the 6.8x51mm Common Cartridge and reflect a priority on maintaining overmatch against peer and near-peer military forces. Next Generation Squad Weapon Program The NGSW program represents the Army’s first comprehensive overhaul of squad-level small arms in decades. It replaces the 5.56mm M4 carbine and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon with new platforms designed around a higher-performance intermediate cartridge. Both the M7 and M250 are produced by SIG Sauer and chambered for the 6.8x51mm hybrid round, which combines brass and steel components to withstand chamber pressures exceeding 80,000 psi. Publicly available manufacturer data cites muzzle velocities approaching 3,000 feet per second, depending on barrel configuration. M7 Rifle Capabilities Selected as the M4 replacement, the M7 is a short-stroke gas piston rifle featuring a free-floating 13.5-inch barrel and monolithic upper receiver. The weapon weighs approximately 8.4 pounds unloaded and incorporates a non-reciprocating side charging handle, folding buttstock, and M-LOK compatible handguard. It supports semi-automatic and fully automatic fire. The M7 is issued with a SIG SLX-series suppressor as standard equipment, intended to reduce both acoustic and visual signatures during combat operations. M250 Automatic Rifle The M250 replaces the M249 SAW and is designed to improve mobility while retaining sustained fire capability. The belt-fed weapon includes a quick-change barrel and folding stock and weighs about 13 pounds unloaded, offering a notable reduction compared to its predecessor. While detailed Army performance data has not been publicly released, open-source figures from SIG Sauer indicate an effective range beyond 800 meters and a cyclic rate between 600 and 750 rounds per minute. Like the M7, the M250 is fielded with an integrated suppressor. M157 Fire Control System Both weapons are paired with the M157 Fire Control, a digitally enabled optic developed by Vortex Optics and Sheltered Wings under a 2022 Army contract. Previous Army disclosures describe the system as combining a variable-power optic with a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, atmospheric sensors, and digital reticle overlay. The system is intended to increase first-round hit probability by presenting real-time ballistic solutions directly in the shooter’s sight picture. Fielding Strategy and Operational Impact FY2026 marks a key milestone in the Army’s Soldier Lethality modernization effort, with weapons, optics, and ammunition fielded concurrently rather than incrementally. Initial distribution will prioritize Close Combat Forces, including infantry, cavalry scouts, engineers, and fire support elements, with early deployments expected in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While unit costs are not detailed in the budget request, the scale of procurement indicates confidence in the program’s maturity and readiness for broader adoption.
  2. FY2026 Procurement Overview The U.S. Army plans to significantly accelerate fielding of its Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) systems in Fiscal Year 2026, according to the Department of Defense FY2026 Budget Request released July 4, 2025. The request includes procurement of 16,154 M7 assault rifles, 2,636 M250 automatic rifles, and 19,524 M157 Fire Control systems. These acquisitions support the Army’s transition to the 6.8x51mm Common Cartridge and reflect a priority on maintaining overmatch against peer and near-peer military forces. Next Generation Squad Weapon Program The NGSW program represents the Army’s first comprehensive overhaul of squad-level small arms in decades. It replaces the 5.56mm M4 carbine and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon with new platforms designed around a higher-performance intermediate cartridge. Both the M7 and M250 are produced by SIG Sauer and chambered for the 6.8x51mm hybrid round, which combines brass and steel components to withstand chamber pressures exceeding 80,000 psi. Publicly available manufacturer data cites muzzle velocities approaching 3,000 feet per second, depending on barrel configuration. M7 Rifle Capabilities Selected as the M4 replacement, the M7 is a short-stroke gas piston rifle featuring a free-floating 13.5-inch barrel and monolithic upper receiver. The weapon weighs approximately 8.4 pounds unloaded and incorporates a non-reciprocating side charging handle, folding buttstock, and M-LOK compatible handguard. It supports semi-automatic and fully automatic fire. The M7 is issued with a SIG SLX-series suppressor as standard equipment, intended to reduce both acoustic and visual signatures during combat operations. M250 Automatic Rifle The M250 replaces the M249 SAW and is designed to improve mobility while retaining sustained fire capability. The belt-fed weapon includes a quick-change barrel and folding stock and weighs about 13 pounds unloaded, offering a notable reduction compared to its predecessor. While detailed Army performance data has not been publicly released, open-source figures from SIG Sauer indicate an effective range beyond 800 meters and a cyclic rate between 600 and 750 rounds per minute. Like the M7, the M250 is fielded with an integrated suppressor. M157 Fire Control System Both weapons are paired with the M157 Fire Control, a digitally enabled optic developed by Vortex Optics and Sheltered Wings under a 2022 Army contract. Previous Army disclosures describe the system as combining a variable-power optic with a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, atmospheric sensors, and digital reticle overlay. The system is intended to increase first-round hit probability by presenting real-time ballistic solutions directly in the shooter’s sight picture. Fielding Strategy and Operational Impact FY2026 marks a key milestone in the Army’s Soldier Lethality modernization effort, with weapons, optics, and ammunition fielded concurrently rather than incrementally. Initial distribution will prioritize Close Combat Forces, including infantry, cavalry scouts, engineers, and fire support elements, with early deployments expected in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While unit costs are not detailed in the budget request, the scale of procurement indicates confidence in the program’s maturity and readiness for broader adoption. View full article
  3. Contract Award and Scope Lockheed Martin has secured a $142.6 million contract modification to continue sustainment support for the United Arab Emirates’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. The award was issued under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and increases the total value of the existing sustainment contract to approximately $876.7 million. The agreement reflects ongoing U.S. policy emphasis on strengthening integrated air and missile defense capabilities among Gulf partners facing persistent missile threats. Sustainment Services and Locations Under the modification, Lockheed Martin Space will provide comprehensive sustainment services for the UAE’s two operational THAAD batteries. The work includes logistics support, training, hardware and software development, missile and ground systems repair and return, field surveillance, and specialized engineering tailored to local operating conditions. Contract performance will take place at several U.S. facilities—Sunnyvale, California; Grand Prairie, Texas; and Camden, Arkansas—as well as at sites within the UAE. The period of performance runs from January 2026 through August 2028, ensuring continuity of system availability. Role of THAAD in UAE Defense THAAD is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase of flight using hit‑to‑kill kinetic interceptors. Operating at higher altitudes than lower-tier systems such as Patriot, THAAD provides an upper-layer defensive shield. In the UAE, the system forms a core component of an integrated air and missile defense architecture intended to counter regional ballistic missile threats and is coordinated with U.S. Central Command frameworks. Sole-Source Contracting Rationale The contract modification was awarded on a sole-source basis, reflecting Lockheed Martin’s role as the prime and sole manufacturer and integrator of the THAAD system. No alternative suppliers possess the proprietary technologies or engineering authority required to maintain the interceptors, fire control systems, and radar integration that underpin THAAD operations. Oversight and Strategic Context The U.S. Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, Alabama, is overseeing the contract under designation HQ0147-19-C-5001, with funding fully obligated at the time of award. While Lockheed Martin has not released a public statement, the work is expected to support ongoing operations and employment across multiple U.S. sustainment sites. Defense analysts note that continued investment in THAAD sustainment underscores long-term U.S.–UAE defense cooperation and signals sustained commitment to missile defense readiness in the Gulf despite shifting global security priorities.
  4. Contract Award and Scope Lockheed Martin has secured a $142.6 million contract modification to continue sustainment support for the United Arab Emirates’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. The award was issued under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and increases the total value of the existing sustainment contract to approximately $876.7 million. The agreement reflects ongoing U.S. policy emphasis on strengthening integrated air and missile defense capabilities among Gulf partners facing persistent missile threats. Sustainment Services and Locations Under the modification, Lockheed Martin Space will provide comprehensive sustainment services for the UAE’s two operational THAAD batteries. The work includes logistics support, training, hardware and software development, missile and ground systems repair and return, field surveillance, and specialized engineering tailored to local operating conditions. Contract performance will take place at several U.S. facilities—Sunnyvale, California; Grand Prairie, Texas; and Camden, Arkansas—as well as at sites within the UAE. The period of performance runs from January 2026 through August 2028, ensuring continuity of system availability. Role of THAAD in UAE Defense THAAD is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase of flight using hit‑to‑kill kinetic interceptors. Operating at higher altitudes than lower-tier systems such as Patriot, THAAD provides an upper-layer defensive shield. In the UAE, the system forms a core component of an integrated air and missile defense architecture intended to counter regional ballistic missile threats and is coordinated with U.S. Central Command frameworks. Sole-Source Contracting Rationale The contract modification was awarded on a sole-source basis, reflecting Lockheed Martin’s role as the prime and sole manufacturer and integrator of the THAAD system. No alternative suppliers possess the proprietary technologies or engineering authority required to maintain the interceptors, fire control systems, and radar integration that underpin THAAD operations. Oversight and Strategic Context The U.S. Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, Alabama, is overseeing the contract under designation HQ0147-19-C-5001, with funding fully obligated at the time of award. While Lockheed Martin has not released a public statement, the work is expected to support ongoing operations and employment across multiple U.S. sustainment sites. Defense analysts note that continued investment in THAAD sustainment underscores long-term U.S.–UAE defense cooperation and signals sustained commitment to missile defense readiness in the Gulf despite shifting global security priorities. View full article
  5. Contract Award and Program Scope A U.S. government contract notice dated December 29, 2025, confirms that Boeing has received a ceiling $8.58 billion award to support Israel’s F-15IA fighter program. The agreement covers the design, integration, testing, production, and delivery of 25 new F-15IA aircraft for the Israeli Air Force, with an option for 25 additional jets. Work will be performed primarily in St. Louis, Missouri, and is scheduled to continue through December 31, 2035. At the time of the award, $840 million in Foreign Military Sales funds were obligated. Contract Structure and Timeline The award is structured as a hybrid arrangement combining cost-plus-fixed-fee with firm fixed price and fixed price incentive firm target elements. It was issued as an undefinitized contract action, allowing engineering and long-lead activities to begin while final scope and pricing are completed. This structure reflects the program’s emphasis on extended integration and systems development rather than a straightforward airframe purchase. While a 2024 congressional notification suggested deliveries could begin in 2029, later reporting has cited 2031 as a planning assumption, underscoring potential shifts between notification estimates and production realities. Relationship to Prior U.S. Notifications The December 2025 notice builds on an August 2024 Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification to Congress that outlined a possible sale of up to 50 F-15IA multirole fighters, along with mid-life update kits for 25 existing F-15I aircraft. That package included engines, radars, mission systems, targeting and navigation pods, weapons interfaces, secure communications, and program support. Together, the disclosures frame the F-15IA effort as a multiyear modernization and expansion of Israel’s heavy fighter fleet. Aircraft Configuration and Systems The F-15IA represents Israel’s customized variant within Boeing’s Advanced Eagle family. Publicly disclosed elements include the AN/APG‑82(V)1 AESA radar, F110‑GE‑129 engines, Advanced Display Core Processor II, Embedded GPS/INS with M‑Code, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and secure identification and communications equipment. The inclusion of systems such as the AN/AAQ‑13 LANTIRN navigation pod supports low‑altitude, all‑weather operations, enhancing routing reliability and time‑on‑target execution in degraded conditions. Payload, Missions, and Operational Role Configured for heavy payload and long-range persistence, the F-15IA can carry dense air‑to‑air missile loads using LAU‑128 launchers, supported by an internal M61A cannon. Boeing has noted that the latest Eagle variants can carry up to 12 AMRAAMs in certain configurations, while retaining capacity for precision air‑to‑ground and standoff weapons. This payload margin supports defensive counter air, escort, and long‑range strike missions, emphasizing endurance, magazine depth, and sustained sortie generation. Strategic Implications With a potential scale of up to 50 aircraft and a program horizon extending to the mid‑2030s, the F‑15IA acquisition is positioned to influence Israel’s airpower posture well before deliveries are complete. The program formalizes a long‑term framework for heavy fighter operations centered on persistence, modernized avionics, and high‑capacity weapons employment, reinforcing Israel’s ability to sustain air operations across a range of defensive and offensive missions while deepening U.S.–Israel defense cooperation.
  6. Contract Award and Program Scope A U.S. government contract notice dated December 29, 2025, confirms that Boeing has received a ceiling $8.58 billion award to support Israel’s F-15IA fighter program. The agreement covers the design, integration, testing, production, and delivery of 25 new F-15IA aircraft for the Israeli Air Force, with an option for 25 additional jets. Work will be performed primarily in St. Louis, Missouri, and is scheduled to continue through December 31, 2035. At the time of the award, $840 million in Foreign Military Sales funds were obligated. Contract Structure and Timeline The award is structured as a hybrid arrangement combining cost-plus-fixed-fee with firm fixed price and fixed price incentive firm target elements. It was issued as an undefinitized contract action, allowing engineering and long-lead activities to begin while final scope and pricing are completed. This structure reflects the program’s emphasis on extended integration and systems development rather than a straightforward airframe purchase. While a 2024 congressional notification suggested deliveries could begin in 2029, later reporting has cited 2031 as a planning assumption, underscoring potential shifts between notification estimates and production realities. Relationship to Prior U.S. Notifications The December 2025 notice builds on an August 2024 Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification to Congress that outlined a possible sale of up to 50 F-15IA multirole fighters, along with mid-life update kits for 25 existing F-15I aircraft. That package included engines, radars, mission systems, targeting and navigation pods, weapons interfaces, secure communications, and program support. Together, the disclosures frame the F-15IA effort as a multiyear modernization and expansion of Israel’s heavy fighter fleet. Aircraft Configuration and Systems The F-15IA represents Israel’s customized variant within Boeing’s Advanced Eagle family. Publicly disclosed elements include the AN/APG‑82(V)1 AESA radar, F110‑GE‑129 engines, Advanced Display Core Processor II, Embedded GPS/INS with M‑Code, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and secure identification and communications equipment. The inclusion of systems such as the AN/AAQ‑13 LANTIRN navigation pod supports low‑altitude, all‑weather operations, enhancing routing reliability and time‑on‑target execution in degraded conditions. Payload, Missions, and Operational Role Configured for heavy payload and long-range persistence, the F-15IA can carry dense air‑to‑air missile loads using LAU‑128 launchers, supported by an internal M61A cannon. Boeing has noted that the latest Eagle variants can carry up to 12 AMRAAMs in certain configurations, while retaining capacity for precision air‑to‑ground and standoff weapons. This payload margin supports defensive counter air, escort, and long‑range strike missions, emphasizing endurance, magazine depth, and sustained sortie generation. Strategic Implications With a potential scale of up to 50 aircraft and a program horizon extending to the mid‑2030s, the F‑15IA acquisition is positioned to influence Israel’s airpower posture well before deliveries are complete. The program formalizes a long‑term framework for heavy fighter operations centered on persistence, modernized avionics, and high‑capacity weapons employment, reinforcing Israel’s ability to sustain air operations across a range of defensive and offensive missions while deepening U.S.–Israel defense cooperation. View full article
  7. Presidential Statement Signals Unacknowledged Strike The United States appears to have conducted its first known drone airstrike against a Venezuelan port facility linked to drug trafficking, marking a potentially significant shift in U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean. On December 29, 2025, President Donald Trump stated that the United States had “hit” and destroyed a dock or coastal loading area in Venezuela described as a logistics point for drug boats. He cited a “major explosion” but did not disclose the location, timing, platform, munition, or the specific U.S. authority responsible for the action. Reporting Points to Covert Drone Operation Subsequent reporting by CNN indicated the strike occurred earlier in December and was carried out by a U.S. drone targeting a remote coastal dock believed to be used by the Tren de Aragua criminal organization. According to the report, the facility was allegedly used to store narcotics and transfer them to small vessels for onward transport. No casualties were reported, as the site was unoccupied at the time of the strike. No U.S. government agency has publicly confirmed these details. Disputed Role of Special Operations Forces CNN further reported that U.S. Special Operations Forces provided intelligence support for the operation. However, a spokesperson for U.S. Special Operations Command denied any involvement, including intelligence support. This contradiction leaves unresolved questions about the scope of interagency participation and whether the strike was part of a broader operational framework beyond publicly acknowledged maritime interdictions. Verification and Attribution Remain Elusive If confirmed, the strike would represent the first known U.S. attack on Venezuelan territory in the current counter-narcotics campaign. To date, Venezuelan authorities have not publicly acknowledged an incident, and no independent imagery, coordinates, or local reporting have emerged. The absence of verifiable evidence prevents independent confirmation of the target location or a credible battle damage assessment. Plausible Platforms and Munitions While unconfirmed, the described target—a remote boat-loading dock—suggests a limited set of aimpoints, including pier structures, fuel storage, and small craft. Analysts assess that a medium-altitude, long-endurance armed drone such as an MQ-9 is a plausible platform due to its surveillance and precision strike capabilities. An AGM-114 Hellfire missile is considered a likely munition for such targets, with any reported “major explosion” potentially resulting from secondary fuel ignition. Small glide bombs remain a possible alternative, though all assessments remain inferential. Strategic Implications Until the United States releases corroborating details, the episode remains defined by uncertainty. What is clear is that U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the region may be entering a phase where covert authorities, precision strike capabilities, and strategic signaling increasingly intersect, even as the evidentiary basis for public verification remains limited.
  8. Presidential Statement Signals Unacknowledged Strike The United States appears to have conducted its first known drone airstrike against a Venezuelan port facility linked to drug trafficking, marking a potentially significant shift in U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean. On December 29, 2025, President Donald Trump stated that the United States had “hit” and destroyed a dock or coastal loading area in Venezuela described as a logistics point for drug boats. He cited a “major explosion” but did not disclose the location, timing, platform, munition, or the specific U.S. authority responsible for the action. Reporting Points to Covert Drone Operation Subsequent reporting by CNN indicated the strike occurred earlier in December and was carried out by a U.S. drone targeting a remote coastal dock believed to be used by the Tren de Aragua criminal organization. According to the report, the facility was allegedly used to store narcotics and transfer them to small vessels for onward transport. No casualties were reported, as the site was unoccupied at the time of the strike. No U.S. government agency has publicly confirmed these details. Disputed Role of Special Operations Forces CNN further reported that U.S. Special Operations Forces provided intelligence support for the operation. However, a spokesperson for U.S. Special Operations Command denied any involvement, including intelligence support. This contradiction leaves unresolved questions about the scope of interagency participation and whether the strike was part of a broader operational framework beyond publicly acknowledged maritime interdictions. Verification and Attribution Remain Elusive If confirmed, the strike would represent the first known U.S. attack on Venezuelan territory in the current counter-narcotics campaign. To date, Venezuelan authorities have not publicly acknowledged an incident, and no independent imagery, coordinates, or local reporting have emerged. The absence of verifiable evidence prevents independent confirmation of the target location or a credible battle damage assessment. Plausible Platforms and Munitions While unconfirmed, the described target—a remote boat-loading dock—suggests a limited set of aimpoints, including pier structures, fuel storage, and small craft. Analysts assess that a medium-altitude, long-endurance armed drone such as an MQ-9 is a plausible platform due to its surveillance and precision strike capabilities. An AGM-114 Hellfire missile is considered a likely munition for such targets, with any reported “major explosion” potentially resulting from secondary fuel ignition. Small glide bombs remain a possible alternative, though all assessments remain inferential. Strategic Implications Until the United States releases corroborating details, the episode remains defined by uncertainty. What is clear is that U.S. counter-narcotics operations in the region may be entering a phase where covert authorities, precision strike capabilities, and strategic signaling increasingly intersect, even as the evidentiary basis for public verification remains limited. View full article
  9. Ukrainian Control in Northern Pokrovsk Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Response Corps reported on Dec. 29 that Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to hold the northern part of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses and have intensified operations west of the city, but these efforts have been repelled. Pokrovsk remains a key defensive stronghold on the eastern front, with Ukrainian troops resisting sustained pressure over the past year. Situation Around Myrnohrad The situation in nearby Myrnohrad, a satellite town located less than 3 kilometers from Pokrovsk, was described by Ukrainian commanders as “difficult.” According to the 7th Rapid Response Corps, Russian forces are applying pressure from the northeast and south. In response, Ukraine has deployed units from its Air Assault Forces and Marine Corps to reinforce existing positions and stabilize the front. Information Operations and Conflicting Claims Ukrainian officials stated that Russian troops conducted what they described as “demonstrative propaganda actions” on the southern outskirts of Myrnohrad. These actions were assessed as having limited tactical value and were primarily aimed at a domestic Russian audience. On Dec. 28, both Ukrainian and Russian sources released conflicting claims and videos regarding control of parts of the town. Ukraine’s Armed Forces said they continue to hold key positions, supported by video footage from ongoing combat operations, while Russian state-controlled media circulated videos showing Russian soldiers raising flags in heavily damaged neighborhoods. Pokrovsk’s Strategic Role Pokrovsk has been one of the most fiercely contested areas in Donetsk Oblast due to its role as a logistical and defensive hub. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly emphasized the city’s importance in preventing further Russian advances in the region. Fighting in surrounding towns such as Myrnohrad reflects ongoing efforts by Russian forces to weaken Ukrainian defensive lines around the city. Alleged Execution of Ukrainian Prisoners of War Separately, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office reported on Dec. 29 that Russian forces allegedly executed two unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war on Dec. 27 in the village of Shakhove, near Pokrovsk. Investigators stated that the soldiers were shot after being captured, marking at least the third reported incident this month involving the killing of Ukrainian POWs. War Crimes Investigation Launched According to prosecutors, one of the prisoners was forced to partially undress at gunpoint before both were executed. A pretrial investigation has been opened under Article 438.2 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code, which addresses war crimes resulting in death. The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office is overseeing the investigation as part of broader efforts to document alleged violations of international humanitarian law.
  10. Ukrainian Control in Northern Pokrovsk Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Response Corps reported on Dec. 29 that Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to hold the northern part of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses and have intensified operations west of the city, but these efforts have been repelled. Pokrovsk remains a key defensive stronghold on the eastern front, with Ukrainian troops resisting sustained pressure over the past year. Situation Around Myrnohrad The situation in nearby Myrnohrad, a satellite town located less than 3 kilometers from Pokrovsk, was described by Ukrainian commanders as “difficult.” According to the 7th Rapid Response Corps, Russian forces are applying pressure from the northeast and south. In response, Ukraine has deployed units from its Air Assault Forces and Marine Corps to reinforce existing positions and stabilize the front. Information Operations and Conflicting Claims Ukrainian officials stated that Russian troops conducted what they described as “demonstrative propaganda actions” on the southern outskirts of Myrnohrad. These actions were assessed as having limited tactical value and were primarily aimed at a domestic Russian audience. On Dec. 28, both Ukrainian and Russian sources released conflicting claims and videos regarding control of parts of the town. Ukraine’s Armed Forces said they continue to hold key positions, supported by video footage from ongoing combat operations, while Russian state-controlled media circulated videos showing Russian soldiers raising flags in heavily damaged neighborhoods. Pokrovsk’s Strategic Role Pokrovsk has been one of the most fiercely contested areas in Donetsk Oblast due to its role as a logistical and defensive hub. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly emphasized the city’s importance in preventing further Russian advances in the region. Fighting in surrounding towns such as Myrnohrad reflects ongoing efforts by Russian forces to weaken Ukrainian defensive lines around the city. Alleged Execution of Ukrainian Prisoners of War Separately, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office reported on Dec. 29 that Russian forces allegedly executed two unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war on Dec. 27 in the village of Shakhove, near Pokrovsk. Investigators stated that the soldiers were shot after being captured, marking at least the third reported incident this month involving the killing of Ukrainian POWs. War Crimes Investigation Launched According to prosecutors, one of the prisoners was forced to partially undress at gunpoint before both were executed. A pretrial investigation has been opened under Article 438.2 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code, which addresses war crimes resulting in death. The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office is overseeing the investigation as part of broader efforts to document alleged violations of international humanitarian law. View full article
  11. Reported Development of Unconventional Warheads Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly developing unconventional warheads, including chemical and biological payloads, for integration with its ballistic missile force, according to informed military sources cited by Iran International on December 29, 2025. If verified, the effort would represent a significant escalation in Iran’s strategic capabilities and raise new regional and international security concerns. Program Leadership and Deployment Indicators The reported initiative is said to be led by the IRGC Aerospace Force. Sources indicated that work on the warheads has accelerated in recent months alongside the movement of mobile missile launchers and support units toward Iran’s eastern regions. Analysts interpret these deployments as potential indicators of increased readiness amid heightened tensions involving Israel and the United States, as well as concerns over renewed strikes on Iranian missile and air defense infrastructure. Technical Characteristics of Reported Payloads According to the sources, the program focuses on modifying existing solid-fuel ballistic missiles to carry non-conventional payloads. Chemical warheads would likely use sealed canisters containing choking or blister agents, designed to rupture at predetermined altitudes to disperse aerosols over wide areas. Biological payloads would present greater technical challenges, requiring temperature-controlled containment and specialized dispersal systems to maintain agent viability during launch, flight, and reentry. Both concepts differ substantially from conventional high-explosive or fragmentation warhead designs. Command, Control, and Intelligence Indicators Iran International reported that the IRGC is also upgrading command-and-control systems associated with its missile forces, potentially to ensure centralized authorization and secure communications for unconventional payloads. Western intelligence agencies cited by the outlet have reportedly observed unusual telemetry data and logistical activity linked to IRGC missile units, suggesting the effort may extend beyond theoretical research. Missile Platforms and Force Structure Iran operates the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. The IRGC Aerospace Force fields short- and medium-range systems such as Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar (300–700 km), as well as more advanced missiles like Dezful and Kheibar Shekan. Medium-range systems including Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Emad exceed 1,000 km in range. Analysts assess the solid-fuel Zolfaghar family as a plausible candidate for unconventional payload integration due to payload capacity and operational history. Strategic Rationale and International Implications Sources described the reported program as a complementary deterrent rather than a replacement for conventional capabilities, intended to raise the cost of military action against Iran in extreme scenarios. This posture contrasts with Tehran’s public opposition to chemical weapons, often citing Iran’s experience as a victim during the Iran-Iraq War. Analysts warn that confirmation of chemical or biological warheads on Iranian missiles would trigger severe international condemnation, likely sanctions expansion, and increased military preparedness across the region. Iran continues to deny pursuing unconventional weapons, maintaining that its missile program is defensive and compliant with international obligations.
  12. Reported Development of Unconventional Warheads Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly developing unconventional warheads, including chemical and biological payloads, for integration with its ballistic missile force, according to informed military sources cited by Iran International on December 29, 2025. If verified, the effort would represent a significant escalation in Iran’s strategic capabilities and raise new regional and international security concerns. Program Leadership and Deployment Indicators The reported initiative is said to be led by the IRGC Aerospace Force. Sources indicated that work on the warheads has accelerated in recent months alongside the movement of mobile missile launchers and support units toward Iran’s eastern regions. Analysts interpret these deployments as potential indicators of increased readiness amid heightened tensions involving Israel and the United States, as well as concerns over renewed strikes on Iranian missile and air defense infrastructure. Technical Characteristics of Reported Payloads According to the sources, the program focuses on modifying existing solid-fuel ballistic missiles to carry non-conventional payloads. Chemical warheads would likely use sealed canisters containing choking or blister agents, designed to rupture at predetermined altitudes to disperse aerosols over wide areas. Biological payloads would present greater technical challenges, requiring temperature-controlled containment and specialized dispersal systems to maintain agent viability during launch, flight, and reentry. Both concepts differ substantially from conventional high-explosive or fragmentation warhead designs. Command, Control, and Intelligence Indicators Iran International reported that the IRGC is also upgrading command-and-control systems associated with its missile forces, potentially to ensure centralized authorization and secure communications for unconventional payloads. Western intelligence agencies cited by the outlet have reportedly observed unusual telemetry data and logistical activity linked to IRGC missile units, suggesting the effort may extend beyond theoretical research. Missile Platforms and Force Structure Iran operates the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. The IRGC Aerospace Force fields short- and medium-range systems such as Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar (300–700 km), as well as more advanced missiles like Dezful and Kheibar Shekan. Medium-range systems including Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Emad exceed 1,000 km in range. Analysts assess the solid-fuel Zolfaghar family as a plausible candidate for unconventional payload integration due to payload capacity and operational history. Strategic Rationale and International Implications Sources described the reported program as a complementary deterrent rather than a replacement for conventional capabilities, intended to raise the cost of military action against Iran in extreme scenarios. This posture contrasts with Tehran’s public opposition to chemical weapons, often citing Iran’s experience as a victim during the Iran-Iraq War. Analysts warn that confirmation of chemical or biological warheads on Iranian missiles would trigger severe international condemnation, likely sanctions expansion, and increased military preparedness across the region. Iran continues to deny pursuing unconventional weapons, maintaining that its missile program is defensive and compliant with international obligations. View full article
  13. U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIS in Northwestern Nigeria U.S. forces carried out multiple airstrikes on Christmas Day in Nigeria’s northwestern Sokoto state, marking the first known direct U.S. military action against militant targets inside the country. The strikes targeted camps linked to the Islamic State (ISIS), according to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Operational Details and Damage Reports AFRICOM confirmed that several airstrikes were conducted against ISIS positions in Sokoto state, including at least one strike near the village of Jabo. Residents told the Associated Press that a large explosion was heard late Thursday in an area not previously associated with militant attacks. Video released by the Department of Defense showed at least one missile launch from a U.S. naval vessel. AFRICOM stated that multiple ISIS militants were killed, though casualty figures have not been independently verified. Photographs published by Reuters showed scorched farmland near Jabo following the strikes. U.S. and Nigerian Government Statements President Donald Trump announced the operation on social media, describing the targets as ISIS militants responsible for killing Christians in northwestern Nigeria. He did not provide operational specifics. Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar confirmed to the BBC and Al Jazeera that Nigeria coordinated with the United States in advance and that the strikes had been planned “for quite some time.” Tuggar emphasized that the operation was not directed at any religion. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth later posted on X that further U.S. actions could follow. Context of Security and Sectarian Claims Nigeria faces multiple, overlapping security challenges, including insurgencies, banditry, and communal violence. While the country is broadly divided between a predominantly Christian south and Muslim north, researchers note that much of the violence in northern regions affects Muslim communities and is driven more by economic and political factors than by sectarian conflict. In November, Trump publicly warned of possible U.S. military action, accusing Nigerian authorities of failing to curb violence against Christians. Broader U.S. Military Activity in Africa The Nigeria strikes follow increased U.S. surveillance flights over the country in recent weeks, according to Reuters. They also come amid an expanded U.S. air campaign against ISIS in Africa. In 2025, American forces have conducted dozens of strikes in Somalia, including operations launched from the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea.
  14. U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIS in Northwestern Nigeria U.S. forces carried out multiple airstrikes on Christmas Day in Nigeria’s northwestern Sokoto state, marking the first known direct U.S. military action against militant targets inside the country. The strikes targeted camps linked to the Islamic State (ISIS), according to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Operational Details and Damage Reports AFRICOM confirmed that several airstrikes were conducted against ISIS positions in Sokoto state, including at least one strike near the village of Jabo. Residents told the Associated Press that a large explosion was heard late Thursday in an area not previously associated with militant attacks. Video released by the Department of Defense showed at least one missile launch from a U.S. naval vessel. AFRICOM stated that multiple ISIS militants were killed, though casualty figures have not been independently verified. Photographs published by Reuters showed scorched farmland near Jabo following the strikes. U.S. and Nigerian Government Statements President Donald Trump announced the operation on social media, describing the targets as ISIS militants responsible for killing Christians in northwestern Nigeria. He did not provide operational specifics. Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar confirmed to the BBC and Al Jazeera that Nigeria coordinated with the United States in advance and that the strikes had been planned “for quite some time.” Tuggar emphasized that the operation was not directed at any religion. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth later posted on X that further U.S. actions could follow. Context of Security and Sectarian Claims Nigeria faces multiple, overlapping security challenges, including insurgencies, banditry, and communal violence. While the country is broadly divided between a predominantly Christian south and Muslim north, researchers note that much of the violence in northern regions affects Muslim communities and is driven more by economic and political factors than by sectarian conflict. In November, Trump publicly warned of possible U.S. military action, accusing Nigerian authorities of failing to curb violence against Christians. Broader U.S. Military Activity in Africa The Nigeria strikes follow increased U.S. surveillance flights over the country in recent weeks, according to Reuters. They also come amid an expanded U.S. air campaign against ISIS in Africa. In 2025, American forces have conducted dozens of strikes in Somalia, including operations launched from the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea. View full article
  15. Bundeswehr Selects New Standard Service Pistol Česká zbrojovka a.s. (CZ) has announced that the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, have selected the CZ P‑10 C OR as their new standard service pistol, designated P13. The selection follows an open international tender and marks the replacement of the P8A1, the Heckler & Koch USP that has been in German service since 1994. CZ described the decision as a major milestone for the company, reflecting its expansion within military procurement programs. P13 Configuration and Technical Overview The P13 is based on the CZ P‑10 C Optics‑Ready model. It is a striker‑fired pistol using a short‑recoil, tilting‑barrel operating system and is chambered in 9×19 mm. Standard magazine capacity is 15 rounds. The pistol features a 102 mm (4‑inch) barrel, an overall length of 187 mm (7.4 inches), and an unloaded weight of approximately 740 g (26 oz). The Bundeswehr variant will be finished in Flat Dark Earth and supplied with a slide cut for mounting optical sights. Service History and Competing Designs Introduced in 2017, the CZ P‑10 C has already been adopted by the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which selected the pistol for service in 2020. During the German tender process, the P‑10 C OR reportedly competed against submissions from other major manufacturers, including Glock and Slovenia’s Arex. The Bundeswehr has not yet announced whether the P13 will be issued with a red‑dot optic as standard equipment, nor has it disclosed any specific sight model under consideration. Manufacturing, Delivery, and Support According to CZ CEO Jan Zajic, all pistols for the Bundeswehr will be produced at CZ’s manufacturing facility in Uherský Brod, Czech Republic. The facility operates under military‑grade quality and compliance standards and supports production for military, law enforcement, and commercial customers. While domestic German production was not a requirement of the tender, CZ will cooperate with its authorized German partner, POL‑TEC GmbH & Co., to support contract fulfillment, logistics, and ongoing service requirements. Significance for CZ and German Procurement CZ was awarded the contract after prevailing in an international competition, reinforcing its position within the European defense market. Company leadership emphasized that the P13 pistols will be manufactured and tested in accordance with Bundeswehr specifications. The adoption represents a generational update to Germany’s standard sidearm and underscores the Bundeswehr’s shift toward modern striker‑fired, optics‑ready handgun platforms for future service use.
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