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AI Models Escalate to Nuclear Use in Majority of War Simulations Leading artificial intelligence models deployed nuclear weapons in 95% of simulated geopolitical conflicts, according to new research from King’s College London. The study found that OpenAI’s GPT-5.2, Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 4, and Google’s Gemini 3 Flash escalated to nuclear use in nearly every scenario tested, raising questions about the risks of integrating advanced AI systems into high-stakes military decision-making. Researchers conducted 21 simulated war games, with each model playing six matches against rival systems and one against itself. The models assumed the roles of national leaders commanding nuclear-armed superpowers in crisis scenarios loosely modeled on Cold War dynamics. Across more than 300 turns, the systems generated approximately 780,000 words of strategic reasoning, exceeding the combined length of War and Peace and The Iliad. Escalation Patterns and Decision Outcomes The simulated crises included border disputes, competition over scarce resources, and threats to regime survival. Each model operated along an escalation ladder ranging from diplomatic protest and surrender to full-scale strategic nuclear war. At least one tactical nuclear weapon was used in nearly every conflict. None of the models chose full surrender, regardless of battlefield conditions. While systems occasionally attempted de-escalation, researchers reported that in 86% of scenarios the models escalated further than their own prior reasoning appeared to support, citing simulated “fog of war” errors. The study recorded clear winners in every simulation, including three scenarios involving strategic nuclear exchanges. Debate Over Simulation Design Edward Geist, a senior policy researcher at RAND Corporation, said the findings may reflect the structure of the simulation rather than inherent tendencies of the models. He noted that the scoring system appeared to reward marginal advantage at the moment nuclear war was triggered, potentially incentivizing escalation. Geist questioned how victory was defined, observing that labeling outcomes as “wins” in scenarios involving strategic nuclear use may indicate a framework that makes nuclear conflict comparatively easy to achieve favorable results. Growing Military Integration of AI The findings emerge as the U.S. Department of Defense expands AI adoption. In December, the Pentagon launched GenAI.mil, a platform integrating frontier AI models into military workflows. At launch, it included Google’s Gemini for Government, with OpenAI’s ChatGPT and xAI’s Grok added through subsequent agreements. Anthropic, developer of Claude, has provided access to its models via partnerships with AWS and Palantir since 2024 and received a $200 million contract to prototype advanced AI capabilities supporting national security. Recent reporting indicates the Defense Department has pressed Anthropic for unrestricted military access to Claude, warning it could designate the model a supply chain risk if demands are not met. Separately, Axios reported that the Pentagon signed an agreement with xAI to allow Grok to operate in classified systems, potentially positioning it as an alternative provider. Researchers emphasized that governments are unlikely to grant autonomous control over nuclear arsenals to AI systems. However, they warned that compressed decision timelines in future crises could increase reliance on AI-generated recommendations, underscoring the need for careful oversight and evaluation of escalation risks. View full article

Kremlin Acknowledges Unmet Objectives Four Years Into War Four years after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has publicly acknowledged that its primary objectives remain unfulfilled. On Feb. 24, presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia has not yet achieved the goals it set at the outset of the war, marking a rare admission of limited progress in a conflict initially expected to be swift. Peskov said the “main goal is to ensure the safety of people who lived and live in eastern Ukraine,” but conceded that “the objectives have not been fully achieved.” The statement underscores the prolonged and costly nature of the war, now entering its fifth year. Early Expectations and Strategic Miscalculations At the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Russian officials and state-aligned commentators projected rapid success. Some Western intelligence assessments at the time also warned that Kyiv could fall within days or weeks. Capturing the Ukrainian capital was widely viewed as a central objective in what appeared to be a strategy aimed at quickly toppling the government. In 2021, Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan declared, “In a war, we'll defeat Ukraine in two days,” a remark that later became emblematic of Moscow’s early expectations. Instead, Ukrainian resistance, supported by Western military and financial assistance, stalled Russian advances and forced a recalibration of battlefield objectives. Human and Material Costs of the Conflict The war has resulted in extensive casualties and destruction. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on Feb. 24 that nearly 1,300,000 Russian troops have been lost since the start of the full-scale invasion, a figure that includes those killed, wounded, missing, or otherwise incapacitated. Independent Russian outlet Mediazona has confirmed the identities of 200,186 Russian military personnel killed in Ukraine as of the same date. Civilian areas across Ukraine have sustained significant damage. Cities and towns in eastern and southern regions have experienced repeated missile and drone strikes, with documented attacks on residential neighborhoods, hospitals, schools, and energy infrastructure. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and millions displaced, according to Ukrainian and international sources. Stalemate on the Battlefield Despite sustained offensives, Russia has not achieved a decisive breakthrough. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to make localized advances along various sectors of the front line, but these shifts have not substantially altered the overall strategic balance. The conflict has increasingly resembled a war of attrition, with heavy artillery, drone warfare, and fortified defensive positions defining much of the fighting. Control over territory in eastern and southern Ukraine remains contested, particularly in the Donbas region, where hostilities have persisted since 2014. Diplomatic Pressure and Territorial Demands Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to intensify pressure on Kyiv through both military and diplomatic channels. Engagements involving U.S. President Donald Trump have been part of broader efforts to influence negotiations and push for concessions, particularly regarding territory in the Donbas region. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has consistently rejected proposals that would formalize Russian control over occupied areas. Multiple public opinion polls indicate that a majority of Ukrainians oppose territorial concessions in exchange for a ceasefire. As the war enters another year, the Kremlin’s acknowledgment that its objectives remain unmet highlights the enduring uncertainty surrounding the conflict’s trajectory and ultimate resolution. View full article

Medvedev Issues Nuclear Warning Over Alleged Arms Transfers Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Feb. 24 that Russia would consider using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine and potentially against France and the United Kingdom if the two NATO members were to provide Kyiv with nuclear weapons technology. Medvedev, who serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, made the remarks on Telegram on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He stated that any transfer of nuclear weapons or related delivery systems to Ukraine would “radically change the situation” and constitute a violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under such circumstances, he said, Russia would use “any means necessary,” including non-strategic nuclear weapons, against targets in Ukraine and, if required, against supplier countries. Russian Intelligence Allegations Medvedev’s comments followed claims by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) that France and the United Kingdom are “actively working” to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons capabilities to secure leverage in potential peace negotiations. According to Russian intelligence, discussions allegedly include the possible transfer of French TN75 small-size warheads designed for the M51.1 submarine-launched ballistic missile, as well as associated delivery systems. Russian officials have not presented evidence to substantiate these claims. Yuri Ushakov, a senior Kremlin aide, said that any Ukrainian attempt to obtain nuclear weapons would influence Moscow’s stance in peace talks and that the United States would be informed of the alleged developments. Denials From Kyiv, London, and Paris Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi rejected the allegations, calling them “absurd” in comments reported by Reuters. A U.K. defense official also dismissed the claims, describing them as unfounded and characterizing the statements as an attempt to deflect attention from Russia’s military challenges. The French government responded publicly on social media, criticizing Moscow’s assertions and implying they were intended to shift focus from the prolonged conflict. Neither London nor Paris has indicated any intention to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons or related technologies. Nuclear Rhetoric Amid Stalled Diplomacy Moscow has previously accused Kyiv of pursuing nuclear capabilities, including claims about potential “dirty bomb” attacks, without providing supporting evidence. Russian officials, including Medvedev, have repeatedly issued warnings about possible nuclear escalation involving Ukraine and its Western allies. The latest exchange comes as diplomatic efforts led by the United States over the past year have not produced a breakthrough toward a ceasefire. Russia continues to press territorial demands while rejecting proposed ceasefire frameworks. Ukraine relinquished the Soviet-era nuclear weapons stationed on its territory under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom provided security assurances in exchange for Kyiv’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Ukrainian officials have consistently stated that the country does not seek to acquire nuclear arms. The renewed nuclear rhetoric underscores heightened tensions as the conflict enters its fifth year, with both military operations and diplomatic negotiations remaining at an impasse. View full article

F-22 Raptors Deploy from RAF Lakenheath to CENTCOM Twelve U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors departed RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom on 24 February 2026, heading toward the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility amid escalating tensions with Iran. The movement follows the collapse of nuclear negotiations with Tehran and signals a reinforcement of U.S. airpower in the Middle East. Open-source flight tracking data and defense OSINT accounts indicate the fighters were supported by three KC-46A Pegasus tankers—ROMA02 (21-46095), ROMA03 (22-46100), ROMA05 (21-46093)—and one KC-135 Stratotanker, ROMA04 (57-1440). The deployment appears to be part of a broader series of transatlantic “Coronet” ferry missions that have positioned fifth-generation aircraft in the United Kingdom as an intermediate staging point before onward movement to the Middle East. Strategic Context and Force Posture Analysts describe the deployment as part of a wider U.S. airpower buildup across Europe and the Middle East, potentially one of the most significant in recent decades. Recent weeks have seen additional F-35 and F-16 fighters, surveillance aircraft, and airborne early warning platforms move into the region, alongside the presence of two carrier strike groups. According to defense assessments, more than 150 U.S. aircraft are now distributed across Europe and the Middle East. The posture provides Washington with a range of military options, from deterrence patrols and defensive counter-air missions to potential strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure or proxy forces. The relocation of F-22s enhances the high-end air superiority component of that force package. Operational Capabilities of the F-22 Package The F-22 Raptor is designed primarily for air superiority missions, with secondary ground-attack capabilities. Its low-observable design, supercruise performance, and advanced sensor fusion enable it to detect and engage airborne threats at extended ranges. The aircraft typically carries AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 infrared-guided missiles within internal weapons bays to preserve stealth characteristics. The accompanying KC-46A Pegasus, derived from the Boeing 767 platform, can refuel aircraft using both boom and hose-and-drogue systems and carry more than 212,000 pounds of fuel. The KC-135 Stratotanker, in service for over six decades, continues to provide essential long-range aerial refueling capacity. Together, these tankers enable sustained fighter operations across intercontinental distances and persistent combat air patrols once in theater. Regional Role and Prior Deployments F-22s have previously operated within CENTCOM, including deployments to Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Missions have included air defense of critical infrastructure, patrols over Syria and the Persian Gulf, and deterrence operations in response to Iranian missile and drone threats. Raptors were also deployed to the region in August 2024 as part of a broader deterrence package. In a potential crisis involving Iran, a squadron of F-22s could provide defensive counter-air coverage for U.S. bases, naval forces, and partner nations. Their capabilities allow them to operate in contested airspace, escort strike packages, and intercept hostile aircraft, cruise missiles, or drones. Data-sharing functions also enable them to act as forward sensors for joint and allied air defense systems. Implications for Regional Security The transfer from RAF Lakenheath underscores the United States’ ability to reposition advanced air assets rapidly from European bases to the Middle East. While the deployment has not been formally detailed in official statements, its alignment with recent force movements suggests a coordinated effort to reinforce deterrence. For regional actors, the introduction of additional F-22s strengthens the survivability and responsiveness of U.S. air forces in the theater. The move both signals resolve to Iran and reassures regional partners that advanced air superiority assets can be surged into position as the security environment evolves. View full article

The recent fall of Pokrovsk marks a notable development in eastern Ukraine, but it does not resolve the larger military or political questions shaping the war. Instead, it sharpens them. As Russian forces consolidate control over the city, attention is increasingly shifting beyond the battlefield to the negotiating table, where troop withdrawal, fortified cities, and security guarantees have emerged as some of the most contentious issues in any prospective peace talks. This is not a story of imminent collapse or decisive victory. It is a story about limits: the limits of force, the costs of attrition, and the narrowing space between what can be taken militarily and what must be negotiated politically. Pokrovsk: a tactical gain with strategic limits Pokrovsk served as an important logistical and transport node in western Donetsk Oblast, supporting Ukrainian movement and sustainment along several axes. Its capture by Russian forces provides Moscow with improved operational positioning and reduces Ukraine’s flexibility in that sector. However, the manner in which Pokrovsk was taken matters as much as the fact that it fell. The fighting leading up to its capture followed a familiar pattern seen elsewhere in eastern Ukraine: slow advances, heavy casualties, and prolonged pressure against prepared defenses. The city’s loss represents a tactical success, not a breakthrough that decisively alters the balance of the war. Crucially, Pokrovsk was never the core of Ukraine’s defensive system in Donetsk. It's fall simplifies Russian approaches, but it does not dismantle the far more formidable defensive network that lies ahead. The fortress belt: the real obstacle Beyond Pokrovsk stands what analysts commonly describe as Ukraine’s fortress belt, a chain of fortified cities including Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk. Together, these urban centers form a layered defensive system built over years and reinforced since the start of the full-scale invasion. This belt is not designed to prevent all advances; it is designed to make advances prohibitively expensive. Its characteristics include: Dense urban terrain favoring defenders Prepared fortifications and fallback positions Overlapping logistics and fire support Redundancy, ensuring that the loss of one city does not unravel the entire system Even with Pokrovsk under Russian control, the fortress belt remains intact. Capturing it would require either sustained urban assaults with high attrition, prolonged interdiction of supply routes, or political outcomes that remove Ukrainian forces without further fighting. It is this reality that gives the belt its growing diplomatic relevance. Attrition and the long war problem Claims that Russia could suffer extremely high monthly casualties if it continues pressing fortified positions vary widely depending on the source and methodology. Exact numbers are difficult to verify and fluctuate with operational tempo. What is far less disputed is the relationship between effort and outcome. Russian gains in Donetsk have generally come at a high cost in personnel and equipment, producing incremental territorial changes rather than decisive operational collapses. This dynamic underpins longer-term assessments, suggesting that full reduction of Ukraine’s fortified Donetsk defenses could take years, absent a major shift in military conditions. Attrition, rather than maneuver, remains the defining feature of the front, and attrition is a poor tool for achieving quick political objectives. Why peace talks keep returning to troop withdrawal When military progress becomes slow and costly, diplomacy tends to fill the gap. This helps explain why troop withdrawal from remaining Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk has become a recurring theme in discussions about a ceasefire or settlement. From Russia’s perspective, securing territory through negotiation rather than further urban fighting could reduce losses, stabilize domestic narratives, and lock in gains already made. From Ukraine’s perspective, withdrawal without meaningful security guarantees risks trading strong defensive positions for future vulnerability. Neither side’s stance is irrational. Both are shaped by battlefield realities. This is why discussions of peace increasingly revolve not around abstract principles, but around specific geography, which cities are held, which lines are manned, and which defenses remain intact. The reinvasion risk A central concern surrounding withdrawal-based proposals is not that they guarantee renewed war, but that they may alter the strategic balance in ways that increase long-term risk. If Ukrainian forces were to withdraw from fortified cities without robust enforcement mechanisms, several consequences would follow: Russia would avoid the most costly phase of urban combat Ukraine would lose prepared defensive depth The attacking force would gain time and space to regenerate capability None of this proves an intent to reinvade. Strategic risk analysis does not depend on intent alone; it depends on capability and incentive. This is why Ukrainian officials and European partners emphasize the need for enforceable guarantees, monitoring mechanisms, and credible deterrence as prerequisites for any territorial concessions. View full article

Ukrainian Forces Reclaim 400 Square Kilometers in Southern Operations Ukrainian forces have regained control of approximately 400 square kilometers (154 square miles) of territory and retaken eight settlements from Russian occupation since the end of January 2026, according to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. The update was provided on Feb. 23 following his visit to Ukraine’s Southern operational zone. Syrskyi stated that Airborne Forces, along with adjacent units, led the operations in the Oleksandrivka direction. The area lies at the intersection of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, a strategically significant junction along the southern front. Operations in the Oleksandrivka Direction The reclaimed territory forms part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to stabilize and push back Russian positions in the south. Syrskyi described the situation as “complicated,” noting that Russian forces continue to apply pressure despite Ukrainian advances. According to the commander, Russian troops are employing artillery, drones, armored vehicles, and small assault groups attempting infiltration. The continued use of combined arms tactics indicates sustained Russian resistance in the sector, even as Ukrainian units report territorial gains. Presidential Statement on Southern Advances President Volodymyr Zelensky on Feb. 22 said Ukrainian forces had liberated 300 square kilometers (116 square miles) during a southern counteroffensive. While he confirmed progress along the southern front line, Zelensky did not specify the exact sector or timeframe of the operation referenced in his remarks. The figures cited by Zelensky and Syrskyi suggest ongoing offensive activity across multiple segments of the southern theater, though officials have not provided a detailed breakdown of settlement names or operational timelines. Broader Context of the 2025–2026 Campaign Russia launched a renewed ground offensive in 2025, concentrating the bulk of its forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast. As part of that campaign, Moscow intensified operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and advanced into the southern portion of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. In September 2025, Zelensky reported that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions had recaptured 160 square kilometers (60 square miles) in Donetsk Oblast and an additional 170 square kilometers (65 square miles) elsewhere along the front. Specific locations for those gains were not disclosed. Diplomatic Pressures Amid Battlefield Developments The latest battlefield updates come as Kyiv faces increasing diplomatic pressure from the United States to consider withdrawing troops from certain Ukrainian-controlled territories as part of a potential agreement with Russia aimed at ending the war. Ukrainian officials have not publicly detailed their response to these proposals. The reported territorial gains in the south underscore Kyiv’s continued military engagement as discussions over a possible settlement remain unresolved. View full article

Sweden Announces $1.42 Billion Military Aid Package Sweden has approved a new military assistance package for Ukraine valued at 12.9 billion Swedish crowns (approximately $1.42 billion), with a primary focus on strengthening Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The Swedish Defense Ministry confirmed the package on Feb. 19, describing advanced short-range air defense as its largest single component. According to the ministry, the air defense capability will feature a modular design integrating gun and missile systems, interceptors, electronic warfare assets, active and passive sensors, and command-and-control systems. While the government did not formally name the system included, recent Swedish statements have referenced the Tridon air defense platform developed by BAE Systems Bofors. Tridon Mk2 System Overview The Tridon Mk2 is a self-propelled, remotely operated 40 mm anti-aircraft artillery system designed for ground-based air defense. Introduced in 2022, the system is intended to address gaps between high-cost missile defenses by providing a rapid-response, lower-cost alternative capable of countering a broad spectrum of threats. Manufacturer specifications indicate the Tridon Mk2 can engage drones, cruise missiles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and certain ground targets, including armored vehicles. Its effective range can reach up to 12 kilometers, depending on ammunition type, sensor configuration, terrain, and target profile. The platform draws on nearly 90 years of Bofors anti-aircraft development experience. It is designed for mobility, ease of deployment, and simplified maintenance. Its modular architecture allows integration with evolving technologies and adaptation to changing operational requirements. Addressing Ukraine’s Air Defense Shortfalls Ukraine has faced persistent air defense challenges amid ongoing Russian missile and drone attacks. Yurii Ihnat, head of communications for Ukraine’s Air Force, stated earlier in February that shortages of air defense missiles have at times left certain systems without available interceptors. Russia has intensified strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the winter months, targeting power generation and distribution facilities. These attacks have heightened the need for layered air defense systems capable of countering both traditional aerial threats and the growing use of unmanned systems. Systems such as the Tridon Mk2 are designed to complement higher-tier missile defenses by providing coverage against drones and low-flying threats, helping preserve more expensive interceptor stocks. Additional Equipment and Cooperation Beyond air defense systems, Sweden’s aid package includes procurement of long-range artillery ammunition, various types of 40 mm air defense rounds, and 12 cm grenade launcher ammunition. The package also expands an existing bilateral cooperation project focused on long-range drone capabilities. Sweden has been a consistent contributor of military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The latest package reflects continued European efforts to reinforce Ukraine’s defensive capacity, particularly in countering aerial attacks on both military assets and critical civilian infrastructure. View full article

Open-Source Data Indicates F-16CJ Movement Toward Middle East Open-source flight tracking information and air traffic control communications on February 19, 2026, indicated that multiple U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons redeployed from Europe toward the Middle East. Washington has not formally confirmed the movement. The reported aircraft include F-16CJ variants configured for the “Wild Weasel” suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission, drawing attention amid heightened regional tensions involving Iran. Accounts citing tracking data suggested that as many as 36 F-16s were involved, with approximately 24 configured for SEAD/DEAD (destruction of enemy air defenses) roles. Aircraft were reportedly sourced from the 169th Fighter Wing at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, and the 480th Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, with additional activity noted at Aviano Air Base. Tanker Support and Transit Routes Tanker movements were observed through Lajes Field in the Azores and Naval Station Rota in Spain. KC-135R Stratotankers and KC-46A Pegasus aircraft appeared to support the transatlantic and Mediterranean transit. While the final destination of the fighters has not been disclosed, the scale and coordination of aerial refueling assets suggest a structured reinforcement effort rather than routine rotation. The composition of the package indicates a focus on countering advanced air-defense networks, a capability central to any high-intensity air campaign in contested airspace. F-16CJ Wild Weasel Capabilities The F-16CJ designation applies to Block 50/52 F-16C aircraft adapted for SEAD missions, replacing the retired F-4G Wild Weasel. A defining feature is the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS), which passively detects and locates hostile radar emitters and provides targeting data for anti-radiation missiles. F-16CJs are wired to employ the AGM-88 HARM and the newer AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). Many also carry AN/ALQ-184 electronic warfare pods capable of jamming or deceiving radar systems. These systems allow the aircraft to independently detect, target, and engage enemy radar without relying on external cueing. Despite their specialization, F-16CJs retain multi-role capability, including air-to-air combat and precision strike, supported by modern radar, data links, and cockpit avionics. Operational Role in Contested Airspace Wild Weasel units are trained to operate inside contested environments, identifying and neutralizing air-defense threats to enable follow-on strike, intelligence, surveillance, and refueling aircraft. SEAD and DEAD missions may involve flying with strike packages, conducting stand-off missile launches, or maintaining orbits near defended airspace to suppress active radars. Historically, F-16CJs played significant roles in operations over the Balkans and Iraq, where degrading integrated air-defense systems was essential to establishing air superiority. Relevance to Regional Tensions Iran maintains a layered air-defense network that includes systems such as the domestically produced Bavar-373 alongside legacy and mobile surface-to-air missile platforms. In any contingency, early air operations would likely prioritize degrading surveillance radars, engagement radars, and command-and-control nodes. A forward-deployed F-16CJ presence would enhance U.S. flexibility, providing options ranging from visible deterrent patrols to rapid SEAD response if coalition aircraft faced threats in international airspace. While such a deployment does not indicate imminent offensive action, it strengthens the ability to secure air access and protect regional forces. The reported movement underscores the continued importance of electromagnetic spectrum dominance and air-defense suppression in modern air warfare, particularly in regions where advanced surface-to-air missile systems shape operational planning. View full article